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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that government quality – operationalized as the ability of government to treat all 
their citizens in an impartial way – levels the ‘playing field’ for economic agents with and without 
connections to politicians and administrators in government, therefore encouraging entrepreneurial 
minded individuals to start or develop their business. Based on a unique data set on the quality of 
government in 172 regions of 18 European countries, the paper shows that regions with more im-
partial governments have significantly more small and medium-sized firms. It is also shown that 
quality of government is a determinant of the spatial distribution of entrepreneurship within coun-
tries. Under partial governments entrepreneurs face incentives to create and maintain special rela-
tions with power holders and therefore to be closer to the source of privileges and locate their ac-
tivities around the national capitals, where the most relevant political connections rest.  
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A recent analysis of one the most exhaustive data sets about regions in Europe, collected for the 
European Commission, reveals “striking regional disparities from differences in productivity, to 
infant mortality rates and vulnerability to climate change” (EU 2010: XII). Although this regional 
gap has been the subject of recent comparative studies (Charron and Lapuente 2012; Tabellini 
2010), most of the political economy research on the determinants of economic development has 
neglected these sub-national differences, focusing instead on factors at the national level, which has 
lead political economist to concentrate on the puzzle of the ‘wealth of nations’. There is an intuitive 
logic behind that preference for national units in comparative research: the national constitutional 
framework, the political system, the legal tradition, and the predominance of some religious or cul-
tural beliefs are all factors expected to exert a uniform effect on what happens within the borders 
of a country. 
In contrast to these studies, this paper addresses the following question: why do 
some regions that have so many common characteristics – e.g. regions within Italy, Spain, Belgium 
or Romania – exhibit such differences in economic outcomes? For instance, data on unemployment 
across EU regions reveals that while Italy has the European region with the lowest unemployment 
rate in 2010 – Bolzano, with a mere 2,7 percent – it also has three regions with rates over 14 per-
cent. Even more markedly, the difference in unemployment rates between Pais Vasco (10,5) and 
other Spanish regions – such as Andalucia (28) or Canarias (28,7) is close to 20 percent points.1 
Given the large number of plausible factors affecting economic growth (and/or employment rates) 
and their measurement problems, a comprehensive answer to the question of what determines the 
‘wealth of regions’ is obviously out of the reach of this paper.2 Instead, we narrow our focus to 
what has been identified by many as a key condition or the ‘engine’ for growth: the level of entre-
preneurship.3 More specifically, and following the mainstream literature on entrepreneurship, we 
focus on the relative size of the corps of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
The paper presents two hypotheses. Firstly, we argue that an impartial government 
that treats entrepreneurs in a non-discriminatory fashion facilitates the calculus on the expected 
return on investment made by acting and would-be entrepreneurs and encourages them to exercise 
                                                     
1
 Eurostat. Released on November 24
th
, 2011. Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/1-
24112011-AP/EN/1-24112011-AP-EN.PDF 
2
 In that sense, we take seriously the criticism that many scholars, since Levine and Renelt’s (1992) pioneering paper, 
have made to the endogeneity problems of any study attempting to explain the determinants of growth. 
3
 The importance of entrepreneurship for economic growth is underlined by numerous academic studies – that will be 
reviewed below – as well as by policy-makers and  influential voices in the public debate. An example would be The 
Economist’s straightforward conclusion that “Europe not only has a euro crisis, it also has a growth crisis. That is be-
cause of its chronic failure to encourage ambitious entrepreneurs” (The Economist 28-7-2012 ) 
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a ‘positive economic activity’: to specialize, to take risks, to make costly asset-specific investments 
and to undertake complex transactions. That is, ceteris paribus, territories with impartial govern-
ments should exhibit higher rates of entrepreneurship. Our second prediction is that government 
impartiality also affects the territorial distribution of firms within countries. The lower the country’s 
level of impartiality, the more political contacts are needed to ‘enter and play the game’, and thus 
entrepreneurship will tend to flourish in the national capital (at the expense of other regions), since 
it is in the capitals where the most relevant political connections rest. The absence of this national 
capital’s premium in countries with impartial governments leads to a more even geographical distri-
bution of businesses. That is, an impartial government leads to both more entrepreneurship in individual 
regions and a more equal territorial distribution of entrepreneurship within a country.   
Additionally, this study contributes to the ‘surprisingly limited’ empirical research on 
entrepreneurship (Djankov et al. 2005) by providing a pioneering large-N test at regional level with 
data for 172 regions from 18 EU countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical 
study looking at entrepreneurship simultaneously at national and sub-national levels. The paper 
proceeds as follows. The next section, after briefly reviewing the literature, develops the two testa-
ble propositions. Subsequently, we describe the research design, sample, data and method em-
ployed in the empirical analysis. A results section presents the main findings, and the conclusions 
discuss potential – yet tentative, given the pioneering nature of study – policy implications. 
 
Theory: Institutions, Entrepreneurship and Growth 
The recognition that government plays an important role in creating conditions for the wealth of 
nations (economic development) is a leading paradigm of the post-neoclassical political economy 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; North 1990; Stiglitz 1989; Wade 1990). Neo-institutionalists under-
score the importance of the state in setting up rules that foster exchange and lower transaction 
costs for economic growth (North 1990, Williamson 1985, 1999). A critical issue, according to the 
neo-institutional account, is the ability of those who control the power of the state – politicians and 
bureaucrats – to manipulate economic rules to their own advantage and the advantage of their as-
sociates (Falachetti and Miller 2001; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Miller 1989, 2000; North 1981; 
North and Weingast 1989; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Rothstein 2010). Yet, as appealing as this 
argument is, the literature has shown less ability to develop testable propositions from it. Even 
  5 
arguably the most influential study – North and Weingast (1989) – has been extensively criticized 
(Clark 1995; Stasavage 2002) because of the difficulties to convincingly attribute the impact of insti-
tutional changes on their proxy for economic development – the historical evolution of interest 
rates. During the last two decades scholars have devoted considerable efforts to measure the ability 
of governments to play by the rules – instead of bending them to their personal and their clique’s 
benefit – most notably through the ‘rule of law’ variable. Available in multitude of cross-national 
indicators from different sorts of organizations, it is argued that the rule of law has “become the 
motherhood and apple pie of development economics” (The Economist, 13-03-2008). The World 
Bank economists Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi consider that one-standard deviation improve-
ment in rule of law “would raise per capita incomes in the long run by a factor of two to three” 
(2005, 1). That is, rule of law is associated with a 300 percent development dividend.  
Nevertheless, the more scholars research on the rule of law, “the more desirable it 
seems—and the more problematic as a universal economic guide” (The Economist, 13-03-2008), 
given the difficulties to identify the particular mechanisms linking it to economic development.4 
This paper proposes a specific mechanism, which has recently been highlighted by political scien-
tists – the concept of quality of government understood as ‘impartiality’ in the implementation of 
public policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) –, as well as a novel empirical operationalization of that 
mechanism.  
We would also like to highlight another shortcoming of the existing political econ-
omy literature on the importance of ‘rule of law’: from both a theoretical and an empirical point of 
view it has only been used to explain variation in development at the national level. The focus on 
national differences follows a straightforward institutionalist logic. As laws and the institutions 
enforcing them normally have a national coverage, one may expect a relatively uniform impact of 
the rule of law over the national territory. Yet, oftentimes quite the opposite is observed within 
countries: despite having the same legal institutions across regions within the same country there 
seems to be remarkable levels of regional inequalities in both economic outcomes as well as in how 
institutions de facto work in each region (Heidenreich and Wunder 2008; Tabellini 2010). We believe 
                                                     
4
 Some economists, like Dani Rodrik, have recently noted their discomfort with the concept: “am I the only economist 
guilty of using the term [rule of law] without having a good fix on what it really means? (…) Well, maybe the first one to 
confess to it.” (The Economist, 13-05-08) 
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our institutional variable – the perceptions of quality of government measured at sub-national level 
– allows us to understand better these within-country regional differences.  
We focus our analysis on the impact of quality of government over a particular (not 
the only one) micro-foundation of economic growth: the decisions by the individuals within a given 
polity on whether to start a business or not. Generally speaking, “entrepreneurship” has been ar-
gued both theoretically (Schumpeter 1934) and empirically (Stel, Carree and Thurik 2005) as one of 
the most important engines of economic development. Yet, at the same time, the concept of entre-
preneurship is complex and therefore open to different interpretations and measurements. For the 
purpose of our study, and following previous research on this field, we examine the current rates of 
the entrepreneurship in a given region, measured as the total number of operating firms rather than 
the number of newly incorporated firms or the number of self-employed. In addition, and also 
following the literature on entrepreneurship, we concentrate on a subset of all firms – small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – because they make up a lion share of all businesses and con-
tribute considerably to employment and GDP (Berkowitz and DeJong 2005; Thorsten, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine 2005; Wennekers and Thurik 1999). 
As mentioned above, by quality of government (QoG) we understand one particular 
institutional characteristic (impartiality), following the definition by Rothstein and Teorell (2008). 
Quality of government refers to the ability of a government to treat all individuals within its juris-
diction in an impartial way irrespective of their social, economic, political, cultural or ethnic posi-
tion. What follows from this definition is that actions of an impartial government are free from 
political partisanship, clientelism and corruption. When impartiality is not the modus operandi of 
government, some individuals have advantages in their dealings with the government over other 
individuals. The enabling conditions include – but are not limited to – political connections, family 
or social ties and money. Therefore, under a partial government it may be rational for ‘unconnect-
ed’ individuals – those whose influence over relevant post holders does not transcend the official 
rules – to limit their contacts with the government.  
We argue that specific implications of living under partial government for entrepre-
neurs are twofold. Firstly, it creates incentives for ‘unconnected’ economic agents to converge on 
the zero-effort Nash-equilibrium: not to initiate a business venture (for would-be entrepreneurs) 
and not to advance the existing business (for active economic agents). Secondly, under a partial 
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government it is rational for economic agents to seek the ‘connected’ status by investing in special, 
i.e. beyond official rules, relations with the holders of political and administrative offices. 
An example of the dissuasive effects of government partiality over entrepreneurship 
is provided by the extensive documentation collected during the judicial inquiry of the Operación 
Guateque case in Spain. The investigation unveiled a network of sixteen officials from the Madrid 
local government that demanded bribes from the city restaurateurs to keep their business in opera-
tion (Público, 14-11-2007a). One of the businessmen, Alvaro Gallardo, recalled how his café was 
closed because there was “a missing paper. But I never got to find out what it was. ... I guess the 
paper is a purple one, with a five and two zeros [i.e. a 500 euro note]” (Público, 14-11-2007b). Mr 
Gallardo also failed to re-launch his café because he could not meet some requirements re-imposed 
by the officials. Interestingly, Mr Gallardo recalls that one of the later prosecuted officials advised 
him to invest in a personal relationship with the relevant official by saying “if you knew who to give 
the money, you would not have been in this situation” (ibid.). Taking into consideration findings 
from recent research that emphasizes the importance of social environment and embeddedness in 
influencing individuals’ decisions about their entrepreneurial future (Mueller 2006), it is difficult to 
downplay the discouraging impact of such behavior by governmental officials on the city’s business 
community and on would-be entrepreneurs in particular. 
Previous research has shown that the negative impact of partial government on en-
trepreneurship goes through a number of interconnected channels, including awarding state subsi-
dies, procurement contracts, tax breaks and other forms of preferential treatment to the cronies of 
the governmental officials (Slinko, Yakovlev and  Zhuravskaya 2005). It can also be through an 
excessive and intricate regulation of business (Djankov et al. 2002) and a patronage-based bureau-
cracy. The former provides an opportunity structure to office-holders to extract rents: the more 
lengthy and cumbersome the ‘doing business’ procedures, the more politicians and bureaucrats 
have to offer to entrepreneurs in terms of shortcuts and other advantages vis-à-vis their competi-
tors. Indeed, following the example mentioned above, the Madrid bar association explicitly stated 
that because it may take years to gather all necessary licenses to open a pub in the city, entrepre-
neurs face incentives to speed up the process through bribery (Público, 14-11-2007a). In turn, a pub-
lic bureaucracy where most of the positions are filled with patronage-based candidates, be it politi-
cal or social patronage (e.g. nepotism), provides an opportunity structure for individuals with  
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suitable political and social endowments to influence decisions of government to their advantage.5   
Through cumbersome regulation, political favoritism and clientelism, partial gov-
ernment (i.e. low QoG) creates an uneven ‘playing field’ and impedes access for those lacking the 
‘connected’ status. These not only raise the cost of entry, but also create uncertainty regarding the 
running of the business in the future, which is detrimental to the calculus on expected return for 
both incumbent and would-be entrepreneurs. Moreover, as previous research has shown, this is 
particularly harmful for small and medium-sized enterprises as large business is not only better 
equipped to deal with the externalities of poor government such as uncertainty and corruption 
(Arauzo-Carod and Segarra-Blasco 2005; Thorsten, Demirguc-Kunt and  Levine 2005; Miller 1989), 
but it may even benefit from it by colluding with authorities (Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 
2005; Sonin 2003).  
Following this discussion we argue that an impartial government (i.e. high QoG) that 
treats entrepreneurs in a non-discriminatory fashion facilitates the calculus on the expected return 
on investment made by acting and would-be entrepreneurs and encourages them to exercise a 
‘positive economic activity’: to specialize, to make costly asset specific investments and to under-
take complex transactions. A non-discriminatory government levels the playing field for economic 
agents with and without political connections and other means of influence over government of-
fice-holders, therefore encouraging more individuals to initiate or maintain a legitimate business 
venture instead of abstaining from entrepreneurship altogether and operating in ‘black’ or ‘grey’ 
markets.6  
We would like to underline that we do not assume would-be entrepreneurs to indi-
vidually prefer QoG. Quite the opposite, as profit-maximization is inherent in business activity, it is 
plausible to assume that any entrepreneur prefers, as her first-best option, a government that largely 
favors her business needs, i.e. a partial government. At the same time, the entrepreneur would cer-
tainly prefer to be not discriminated by the government against her competitors in the marketplace. 
                                                     
5
 There is a growing body of literature that shows that meritocratic bureaucracy, the opposite of a patronage-based 
bureaucracy, exerts a positive effect on such important social phenomena as economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999; 
Feiock, Jeong and Kim 2003; Nistotskaya 2009; Rauch 1995), small business growth (Nistotskaya 2009), reduces 
poverty (Henderson et al. 2007), increases scientific productivity (Lapuente and Fernandez-Carro 2008) and the general 
performance of public agencies (Lewis 2008) while preventing corruption (Dahlstrom, Lapuente and Theorell 2011, 
Rauch and Evans 2000). 
6
 Thus, for instance, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s instead of abstaining from economic 
activity altogether, many entrepreneurs chose to operate in the unofficial economy (Fry and Zhuravskaya 2000; John-
son, Kaufman and Zaido-Labaton 1998).  
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Therefore, as a ‘second best option’ to all economic agents in the marketplace, an impartial gov-
ernment is a stable equilibrium, which should eventually lead to higher levels of entrepreneurship 
than in a situation where there is a limited number of ‘connected’ economic agents. This argument 
is important to understand our second hypothesis. 
For this paper also argues that impartiality or QoG not only affects the number of en-
terprises (hypothesis 1) but also their spatial distribution within a polity (hypothesis 2). In short, hy-
pothesis 2 argues that while countries with higher QoG enjoy a more equal geographical distribu-
tion of entrepreneurship across their territories, in countries with low QoG, business density will be 
significantly higher in the geographic centres of political power relative to peripheral regions, with 
the highest concentration of development being in the national capital regions. This concentration 
of business happens through the following two mechanisms. First, when association with power-
holders beyond the formal rules helps to advance business, individuals (acting and would-be entre-
preneurs) face incentives to achieve the ‘connected’ status. This requires that entrepreneurs not 
only establish informal relations with office-holders but that these connections are maintained con-
tinuously, as administrators and politicians often do not ‘stay bought’ (Mayton 1980, Miller 1989). 
Therefore, it is rational for economic agents to be physically closer to the source of privileges and 
locate their activities in the country’s centers of political power. Secondly, the concentration of 
business is highest in the national capitals because the achievement of special relations with top 
officials in the central government offers prospects of ‘premium’ business pay-offs, ranging from 
enacting preferential regulations (e.g. state subsidies and tax breaks) to selective implementation of 
the existing regulation. In contrast, entrepreneurs in peripheral regions who stay in their regions 
may enjoy less privileged access to the appropriate connections that can ease their business. 
In sum, this paper puts forward two interrelated hypotheses. First, all other things 
being equal, polities with higher quality of government experience higher rates of entrepreneurial activity (i.e. small 
and medium sized business) than polities with lower quality of government [hypothesis 1]. Second, in 
countries with poorer quality of government, entrepreneurial activity (i.e. small and medium sized business) tends to 
concentrate around the centers of political power, most notable in national capitals, as compared to coun-
tries with better quality of government [hypothesis 2].  
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Structure of Comparison, Models and Data 
Unlike most of the comparative studies that have almost exclusively analyzed cross-country varia-
tion, we focus on the quality of sub-national governments to test our first hypothesis. This allows 
us, first, to examine a larger sample than if we restricted our analysis to national differences; second, 
to control for omitted (specially social and cultural) factors difficult to measure and that may vary 
from country to country; and, third, to put into question explanations based on ‘national character-
istics’. Indeed, a number of studies on European regions (Charron and Lapuente 2012; Putman 
1993; Tabellini 2010), despite acknowledging the existence of numerous cultural and linguistic simi-
larities across the different territories that form a European country, have nevertheless elucidated 
notable within-country differences in governance: for instance, the well-known gap between 
Northern and Southern Italy, but also less known – and yet remarkable – differences within Bel-
gium, Spain or Romania. In some cases these within-country differences may be wider than cross-
country ones. Following this strand of research, we explore the effects of the regional variation in 
QoG on the entrepreneurship rates across 172 regions from 18 EU countries (Appendix A).  Data 
for the same 18 countries, yet at the national level, is employed for the empirical test of the second 
hypothesis.  
 
Quality of Government and Entrepreneurship Rates across European Regions  
(Model 1) 
SMALL FIRMS is the dependent variable in Model 1, measured as the number of 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) operating in a region in a given year, which is calculated 
from Amadeus – a comprehensive database on active businesses in Europe.7 The data suggests a 
substantial degree of variation in acting SMEs across countries, across European regions and at the 
sub-national level within countries (Figure 1). For example, Sweden on average has more than 95 of 
SMEs per 100,000 residents and Romania has less than 17.  Inter-regional comparison across the 
EU reveals that Brussels, London, Östra Sverige (Stockholm region) and Prague all have more than 
99 small firms, while Észak és Alföld (HU), Burgenland (AT) and Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO) all have 
less than 10 small firms per 100,000 residents. There is also a striking variation in the rates of en-
trepreneurship within several countries themselves. For example, in Romania, Bucharest region has 
approximately eight times the number of per capita small firms as Sud-Vest Oltenia (53.5 and 6.8 
                                                     
7
 We follow the EU definition of SME that is “enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an 
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million” 
(European Commission 2003).   
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firms per capita respectively). In Italy, Lombardia and Bolzano have 85.6 and 72.5 firms per 
100,000 residents, while Calabria has just 10.5, and in Belgium, the Vlaams Gewest (Flanders) re-
gion has more than 2.5 times more per capita small firms than Wallonia (83.3 compared with 31.1).  
The data at the regional level is available only for three years, and thus due to this limitation we take 
the average so as to limit potentially misleading bias from any one given year.   
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF SMES IN EU REGIONS, PER 100,000 RESIDENTS, 2007-2009 
 
Source: Authors constructed from Amadeus. 
 
The explanatory variable of primary interest is the level of quality of government for 
the regions in the sample. As with any complex concept in the social sciences, QoG is a challenge 
to capture empirically. For this reason scholars have mostly relied on ‘soft measures’ of QoG, based 
primarily on opinion surveys of citizens, firms, risk-assessment groups and IGO’s. We utilize new 
data collected in a European Commission-funded citizen-survey on QoG across 172 EU regions in 
2009-2010 (see Appendix B more a more in depth description and data by region), whereby citizens 
rated based on their own personal experiences and perceptions the quality of three public institu-
tions most often administered or politically run at the sub-national level (education, health care and 
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law enforcement). Sub-national assessments of QoG are very limited, in particular multi-country 
ones, and this represents a pioneering effort in measurement beyond the national level and an em-
pirical contribution to the literature. The obtained measure – EQI – has been used in several re-
cently published studies (Charron and Lapuente 2012, Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente. 2012). 
Potential entrepreneurs’ decision-making process about whether to start a business 
or not they rely heavily on the clues provided by the social environment (Mueller 2006). As as 
Kaufman et al (2008:3) argue “perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their percep-
tions, impression, and views”, thus we believe that for the purpose of this analysis the experience 
and perception of QoG by a random sample of citizens within each region is a suitable proxy.  
Therefore, if anything it is the individuals’ perception of the extent of impartiality of the government 
that influences their calculations on expected long-term utility from entrepreneurship. We recognise 
that this indicator does not directly measure the aspects of the QoG pertaining to doing business, 
instead capturing a larger regional picture of QoG within the region. Thus we assume that when 
regional governments exhibit higher impartiality and lower corruption in carrying out their core 
public services, then their actions with respect to business registration, permits, licencing, certifica-
tion and such like are more likely to be impartial.8  
 Following the literature, we control for two families of factors that proved to be 
robustly associated with the rates of entrepreneurship: psychological/cognitive (Baron 1998; By-
grave 1989) and sociological (Hoang and Antoncic 2002; Thornton 1999). The ‘psychology of en-
trepreneurship’ is captured by ENTERPRENEURIAL INDEX, based on four attitudinal ques-
tions from a 2009 Eurobarometer survey (Appendix C). A single question from the same survey, 
capturing one of the most studied psychological traits in entrepreneurship research – locus of con-
trol (Hansemark 2003; Mueller and Thomas 2001) – is employed as an alternative measure of the 
psychological/cognitive family of factors in robustness checks. 
Regarding the ‘sociology of entrepreneurship’, we focus on two standard indicators 
from the relevant literature: social diversity (Basu and Altinay 2002; Carswell and Rolland 2004; 
Dodd and Gotsis 2007; Ensing and Robinson 2011; Hechavarria and Reynolds 2009; Katila and 
Wahlbeck 2011; Wang and Altinay 2010) and human capital (Audretsch and Lehmann 2005; Lee, 
Florida and Acs 2004). Although several indices of social diversity, such as ‘ethno-linguistic frac-
                                                     
8 For example, at the national level we find that citizen perceptions of the presence/absence of corruption in their coun-
tries correlates strongly with survey data asking international businesspeople whether or not they have paid bribes to 
enter the marketplace or do business in certain countries.   
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tionalization’, are readily available at the national level, comparable sub-national data is not availa-
ble. We thus take the share of non-EU residents in the total regional population – DIVERSITY – 
as a suitable proxy (Eurostat, year 2008). An obvious weakness of this measure is that it does not 
capture diversity when a region has a strong minority of residents from another EU country, as is 
the case with a region like Nord Vest in Romania, with approximately 20 percent ethnic Hungari-
ans.  However, it does give us some indication of the dynamics of the region’s diversity in that it 
captures the relative size of the community of local residents that have arrived from outside the 
EU. Regarding human capital, in addition to the existing justifications of its impact on entrepre-
neurship, we reason that in advanced economies as the EU, business opportunities would lay in 
areas requiring relatively high skill and educational capacity. To capture the regional human capital, 
we employ a variable reflecting the aggregated level of education, which is a common proxy in this 
literature (Arenius and De Clercq 2005; Bates 1990; Davidsson and Honig 2003; Thompson, Dylan 
and Knowing 2010). EDUCATION is the percentage of the population with a post-secondary 
education or higher (Eurostat, years 2001-2006, averaged).       
In addition several factors outside the core variables are considered. One important 
control variable is TOURISM, measured as the share of nights spent by non-residents in all collec-
tive tourism accommodation establishments for each region annually (Eurostat, years 2005-2009, 
averaged). Per capita tourism revenues would be a better measure of tourism, but unfortunately it is 
not available at the regional level. We however argue that TOURISM captures the ‘demand’ to visit 
a region by outsiders.  As tourism stands as a salient feature of economic structure of many Euro-
pean countries and regions, it is reasonable to expect that regions that have certain geographic ad-
vantages (weather, beaches, mountains, etc.) have ‘built in’ incentives for entrepreneurship and thus 
higher influx of tourists would have a greater demand for hotels, restaurants and cafes, which are 
predominantly small and medium business. A measure of economic development – GDP (Euros, 
PPP per capita, logged) – is included to control for the notion that more developed regions have an 
advantage in attracting more firms (Wennekers et al. 2005).  Also we control for recent past history 
in the region’s economy, hypothesising that if the current vivacity of the SME community is influ-
enced by current macro-economic trends, then regions with higher rates of recent growth 
(GROWTH) would parlay this into a greater number of SMEs.  Although admittedly there are in-
herent problems with endogeneity in relations between GDP, GROWTH and SMALL FIRMS, we 
therefore attempt to remedy this by taking the economic development levels from the mid-1990’s 
(averaged for 1995-1997) and GROWTH from a time point prior to the outcome variable (averaged 
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for 2000-2007) to account for both historical and recent advantages in relative regional develop-
ment.  
We also control for geographical factors: capital regions (expecting them to have a 
higher relative number of SMEs as compared with other regions in the country), interregional dif-
ferences in population and area size. Whilst CAPITAL is a dummy variable, the population density 
measure is a continuous variable for each region (2007-2009, averaged, from Eurostat), whereby we 
believe that larger concentrations of residents provide more opportunities for SMEs on average. 
Finally, because our model may be overlooking several excluded country-level factors that may 
systematically affect levels of SMALL FIRMS, such as the legal and banking systems or taxation, 
country fixed effects are included in all models.  Appendix D provides summary statistics and data 
sources for all variables. 
 
Quality of Government and Interregional Inequalities in Entrepreneurship Rates within 
European Countries (Model 2) 
 
In the second empirical test we look at the link between QoG and the spatial inequalities in entre-
preneurship rates within 18 countries of the sample. There are many options available to scholars to 
capture special inequalities, including well-known indices, such as the Gini, Theil,  Herfindahl or 
Coefficient of Variation (Shanker and Shah 2003). Even though we test several of these measures 
for robustness purposes, we construct our own index of regional inequality of small firms that at-
tempts to best test our hypothesis of ‘capital region bias’.  Since we hypothesise that the lower the 
QoG in a country on whole, the higher the concentration of SMEs in the capital region, we de-
signed the measure that specifically captures this dynamic:   
 
                                             
     
            (
  
  )
∑                  (
  
  
)  
  (
 
 
)
⁄                                     (1) 
where capital ratio inequality in country ‘x’ (          ) is equal to the number of small firms per 
capita in the capital region ‘z’, multiplied by the proportion of the total population in capital region 
‘z’ in country ‘x’ over the sum total of all other ‘i’ regions’ per capital small firms multiplied by their 
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respective proportion in country ‘x’ (
  
  
).  We find that this number is somewhat sensitive to the 
number of regions within each country, thus we adjust for this by dividing ‘            by one 
minus the inverse number of total number of ‘n’ regions in country ‘x’. Put simply, the greater the 
ratio of the per capita firms in the capital region is relative to all other regions – accounting for the 
population share – the greater the level of    ’.   
In the robustness check we employ two alternative specifications of the dependent 
variables: a population weighted Gini index of spatial inequalities in entrepreneurship rates for each 
country year for 2007-2009 averaged and a modified Herfindahl Index (‘MH’)9.  In line with studies 
that used several different specifications of inequality measure (Shaker and Shah 2003, Ezcurra and 
Pascual 2008), we find this study’s measures are highly correlated within our sample (the MH and 
Gini at 0.92, the MH and CR at 0.80 and the Gini and CR at 0.82). 
Regarding the main independent variable in question, we remain consistent with our 
notion of QoG as impartiality, and, in trying to capture the most appropriate measure for our con-
cepts of political contacts and clientalism, we operationalize the country-level QoG using a leading 
measure of corruption – Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, year 2009).  To 
check for the robustness of CPI, we also use the World Bank’s Control of Corruption (Kaufman, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009).   
As far as controls are concerned, we postulate that the level of trade openness may 
impact the spatial distribution of small business, as Krugman (1991) has shown that more open 
countries tend to have more spatially concentrated economic development, in particular when there 
is a large change in openness over a relatively short period of time.  It is plausible to expect that for 
the post-Communist states the ‘shock’ of joining a common market – the EU – would produce 
uneven regional growth with much concentration in certain areas. GLOBALIZATION is the 
change in the country’s trade openness taken from the KOF Globalization data from the years 
1991-1993 (averaged) to 2008 (Drehler 2006). It is expected that the faster the pace of change is, 
the greater the intraregional unevenness in the vivacity of SMEs, ceteris paribus.  
Also, as the literature on sub-national economic disparities underscores the impact 
of political decentralization on regional variation in social and economic outcomes (Rodriguez-Pose 
and Gill 2004), it is plausible to expect that greater political autonomy of regions from the center 
                                                     
9
 for a further discussion and specific construction formulas for these two alternative measures, see Appendix E 
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translates to greater intra-regional variation in the number of SMEs. We account for this in two 
ways: through simple dummy variables for federal, semi-federal and unitary states and with a con-
tinuous variable - the amount of ‘self-rule’ by sub-national actors in each country (Hoogue, Liesbet 
and Schakel 2010).10 
In addition, we control for the overall level of household income inequality, using 
the standard Gini index measure from the UN’s Development Indicators. We would expect that 
more unequal countries with respect to income will be more uneven in the distribution of SMEs as 
well.  Following the modernization literature (Kuznets 1955, Williamson 1965), regional wealth 
inequalities can be seen as a byproduct of development from the period of national industrializa-
tion, therefore transitioning countries would have higher levels of regional inequality compared to 
developed countries. We therefore control for levels of GDP per capita to account for this.  To 
best avoid issues of reverse-causality, we take the measures of income inequality and GDP per capi-
ta prior to the outcome variable (1990-1999, averaged).  Finally, we include controls for population 
density (Eurostat, year 2009) and whether a country is a EU15 member or not. We anticipate that 
countries with greater levels of population density will most likely have more uneven regional dis-
tributions of SMEs and the EU-15 countries with have less regional variation.  Appendix D pro-
vides summary statistics and data sources for all variables.  
 
Results  
Quality of Government and Entrepreneurship Rates across European Regions (H1) 
Before proceeding with the empirical results, a note on the potential problems of endogeneity be-
tween SMEs and QoG due to the cross-sectional nature of the data is needed. First, there could be 
a problem of reverse causality as higher levels of entrepreneurship may create a demand for higher 
QoG. For this problem the use of time series data for both EQI and SMALL FIRMS would be the 
optimal solution. However, data availability for the sub-national level, even in an advanced industri-
al world area such as the EU, remains limited. In an attempt to remedy the problem of reverse 
causality we control for the levels of economic development (GDP and GROWTH) prior to the 
outcome variable. There could also be an issue of omitted factors that can explain both the QoG 
                                                     
10
 Federal states in the sample are Belgium, Austria and Germany.  Spain and Italy are coded as semi federal and the 
rest are coded as unitary.  ‘Self rule’ is taken from the ‘regional authority index’ (RAI) 
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evaluation by the citizens and industry structure in the region. Therefore we proceed with caution 
and ‘tone down’ claims of causality that imply that we provide empirical evidence that changes in 
EQI  lead to changes in SMALL FIRMS. However, we would argue that providing strong correla-
tion evidence is a first step in the right direction and that establishing empirical link constitutes a 
substantial contribution.   
 
TABLE 1: QOG AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES ACROSS EUROPEAN REGIONS:  
OLS ESTIMATES 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
                        
EQI 4.5*** 4.7*** 10.2*** 9.5*** 9.2*** 9.4*** 9.5*** 9.8*** 3.9** 7.9*** 4.4** 
  -5 0 0 0 -0.001 0 0 0 -0.04 -0.002 -0.02 
Population Denisty   
1.8 5.53*** 4.7** 6.4*** 6.7*** 6.9*** 5.1*** 2.7* 4.0** 2.2 
    
-0.39 -0.001 -0.02 0 0 0 -0.003 -0.06 -0.03 -0.16 
Capital Region   
27.3*** 22.1*** 17.9*** 8.4 19.5*** 15.7*** 16.6*** 11.8** 6.6 0.3 
    
0 0 0 -0.14 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.02 -0.18 -0.95 
Regional diversity       
4.7** 
          
4.8** 1.9 
        
-0.02 
          
-0.02 -0.38 
Education         
8.1*** 
        
8.5*** 6.2*** 
          
0 
        
0 -0.001 
Entreprenuerial Index           
6.1*** 
      
3.9** 0.01 
            
-0.003 
      
-0.04 -0.96 
GDP Growth (ave. 2007-07)             
3.5*** 
      
2.5** 
              
-0.01 
      
-0.02 
Tourism               
0.23*** 
    
0.12 
                
-0.01 
    
-0.12 
GDP (PPP p.c. log1995-97)                 
36.7*** 
  
26.3*** 
                  
0 
  
0 
Constant 30.1*** 18.7* 10.9 10.3 0.7 8.5 -6.7 5.7 -319.3*** 8.5 -237.9*** 
  0 -0.07 -0.19 -0.27 -0.93 -0.35 -0.47 -0.61 0 -0.29 0 
Obs.  172 172 172 172 172 172 168 168 172 168 168 
Rsq.  0.06 0.3 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.85 
Note: p-values from robust standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the number of SMEs per 100,000 residents. 
All models but 1 and 2 include fixed country effects.  Models where GROWTH, TOURISM or ENTERPRENEURIAL 
INDEX are used do not contain data for the four French overseas regions, thus the sample size is reduced by 4.  ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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Table 1 reports the econometric results for hypothesis one. Overall it finds support 
in the data: irrespective of the model specification, EQI is positively and significantly associated 
with the vivacity of small business in European regions. Holding only geographical factors con-
stant, the effect of EQI is stronger within countries than EU-wide (Models 2 and 3).  The quantita-
tive significance of EQI is also substantial: a one standard deviation increase in EQI is associated 
with approximately 10.2 more SMEs per capita (Model 3).  In the context of the sample, this helps 
to explain why the French region of Bretagne (standardized EQI score of 1.03) has about 26 small 
firms per 100,000 residents and another French region Languedoc-Roussillon (EQI=0.51) has only 
19; why two similar sized region in Italy – Friuli-Venezia Giulia (EQI=0.13) and Abruzzo (EQI = -
0.99) – have a difference of roughly 18 per capita small firms. In the same model, we find that on 
average capital regions have about 23 more SMEs per 100,000 residents than non-capital regions, 
while more densely populous regions have more SMALL FIRMS per capita.  
In models 4-6 we test each of the core explanatory factors for entrepreneurship – 
sociological and psychological/cognitive – individually controlling for fixed effects. We elect to 
standardize EDUCATION, DIVERSITY and ENTREPRENURIAL INDEX and also EQI for 
easier comparison of substantive effects. Results show that both indicators for the ‘sociology of 
entrepreneurship’ and the psychological/cognitive measure have a strong and positive impact on 
the dependent variable, among which EDUCATION having the largest substantive effect. At the 
same time, EQI is a more powerful predictor of the entrepreneurship rates than any of the core 
control variables taken individually. In models 7-9, macroeconomic indicators are controlled for, 
with each of these demonstrating a significant impact on the dependent variable.  The results also 
show that the QoG measure is highly robust, even when controlling for the most demanding factor 
– past levels of GDP per capita (Model 9).   
In Model 10 a ‘horserace’ between the core factors of entrepreneurship, controlling 
for the geographical factors and country fixed effects shows EDUCATION winning by a small 
margin: its effect on SMALL FIRMS is about 7.5 per cent larger than that of EQI, yet a post re-
gression t-test shows this difference between these two coefficients to be insignificant (p-value = 
0.28). Model 11 includes all explanatory variables, and while EDUCATION remains the most po-
tent among the core factors, the EQI retains its relative strength and significance.  
To check the robustness of the results a different specification of the dependent 
variable is employed, i.e. firms with annual turnover exceeding 50,000 Euros. It is found that the 
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difference between the new estimates and those reported in Table 1 is negligible. In addition Table 
2 reports estimates from nine additional robustness check models. We use two alternative measures 
of the QoG disaggregating EQI into corruption and impartiality elements (Appendix B). Models 1 
and 3 are basic models with country fixed effects and geographic controls; and models 2 and 4 
include all other controls. We find that the disaggregated measures of the QoG are significant ex-
planatory factors for SMALL FIRMS in each of the first four models, although similar to the re-
sults in Table 1, EDUCATION remains a slightly more powerful explanatory variable in compari-
son.   
TABLE 2: QOG AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES ACROSS EUROPEAN REGIONS: ROBUSTNESS 
CHECK 
 
Variable                       All Regions                       Politically Relevant Regions Only  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
EQI                   
          14.1*** 11.9*** 5.9***     
EQI (corruption)         0 0 -0.01     
  
10.1*** 3.7*           5.8***   
EQI (Impartiality) 
0 -0.08           -0.01   
      8.7*** 4.7***         6.2*** 
Pop. Density (log)     -0.001 -0.008         -0.003 
  5.6*** 2.2 5.2*** 2.1 4.1** 2.1 -0.27 -0.3 -0.23 
Capital Region -0.001 -0.16 (0.0029 -0.16 -0.02 -0.25 -0.86 -0.83 -0.87 
  21.8*** 0.5 21.9*** 0.02 16.6*** 3.9 1.1 0.77 1.2 
Reg. Diversity 0 -0.96 0 -0.98 -0.01 -0.57 -0.87 -0.89 -0.86 
    1.6   2.1   6.5*** 1.5 1.4 1.5 
Education   -0.46   -0.34   -0.001 -0.39 -0.46 -0.39 
    6.4***   6.2***   6.4*** 5.1*** 5.5*** 5.2*** 
Entreprenuerial Index   -0.01   -0.001   -0.002 -0.01 -0.002 -0.003 
    -0.03   -0.2   1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.6 
Growth (ave. 2000-07)   -0.98   -0.98   -0.34 -0.29 -0.28 -0.29 
    2.8***   2.6**     2.2** 2.1** 2.0* 
Tourism   -0.01   -0.03     -0.04 (0.05 -0.08 
    0.12   0.11     0.07 0.07 0.06 
GDP (PPP p.c. log1995-97)   -0.11   -0.14     -0.38 -0.37 -0.47 
    26.8***   27.5***     33.6*** 33.7*** 35.1*** 
Constant   0   0     0 0 0 
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  10.5 -243.5*** 13.9* -247.0*** 16.9** 16.6** -291.6*** -292.6*** -304.4*** 
Obs.  -0.21 -0.007 -0.09 0 -0.04 -0.03 0 0 0 
Rsq.  172 168 172 168 117 112 112 112 112 
  0.73 0.84 0.72 0.84 0.68 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.82 
Note: p values from robust standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is SMEs per 100,000 residents. All models 
include fixed country effects. Models where GROWTH, TOURISM or the ENTERPRENEURIAL INDEX are used 
do not contain data for the four French overseas regions, thus the sample size is reduced by 4.  Politically relevant regions are 
discussed in footnote 8.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
In models 5-9 we replicate the analysis on a sample of only ‘politically relevant re-
gions’.11  It is found that the effects of EQI are stronger, compared to the full sample. In fact, in the 
horserace between EQI and the psychological and sociological factors (Models 6-7), we find that 
EQI has the largest substantive impact on SMALL FIRMS. Thus, a one standard deviation increase 
in EQI equates to about 12 additional SMEs per capita, compared with 6.5 or less based on a simi-
lar increase in DIVERSITY, EDUCATION or ENTREPRENURIAL INDEX. Moreover, we 
find that EQI Corruption and EQI Impartiality in fully specified models 8 and 9 produce very similar 
estimates to those in model 7 with the original EQI scores as the dependent variable. This suggests 
that the quality of government may have a stronger relationship with entrepreneurship when the 
elected regional officials have a policy control over some important policy areas, as those covered 
in EQI. 
It is worth noting important effects exerted by several control variables. First, pre-
existing levels of economic development, captured by GDP per capita in the mid-1990s, is in fact 
the strongest determinant of the magnitude of contemporary SMEs rates. A similar effect applies to 
more recent macro-economic trends: one per cent increase in growth in 2000-2007 is associated 
with about three more SMEs per capita, ceteris paribus.  Second, whilst significant in model 8 in Ta-
ble 1, TOURISM is not robust to the inclusion of the other two macroeconomic variables.  Finally, 
in most models, we find that capitals and more densely populated regions have greater levels of 
SMALL FIRMS on average.   
Overall, the proposition that impartial governments foster small business growth 
finds its support in the data. Our analysis showed that regions in which governments are perceived 
                                                     
11
 We consider a region ‘politically relevant’ if it has a directly elected legislature which is politically (or at least adminis-
tratively) responsible for one of the three policy areas on which citizen opinions of quality services are based from EQI – 
education, health care or law enforcement.  All regions from Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Belgium, France, Poland 
and Denmark along with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland from the UK are included according to these criteria.    
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by their residents as more impartial enjoy on average higher rates of small business than regions in 
which governments are perceived as more partial and corrupt. The effect of EQI is robust to dif-
ferent modelling choices, although it is not always the most powerful predictor. 
 
Quality of Government and Interregional Inequality of Entrepreneurship Rates within 
European Regions (H2) 
 
Figure 2 shows the simple bivariate relationship between the Capital Ratio (CR) measure of spatial 
inequality of entrepreneurship rates and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The two are highly 
correlated (-0.68), providing strong initial support for the claim that more corrupt countries have 
greater regional inequalities with respect to SMEs per capita. Moreover, CPI alone explains over 45 
per cent of the variation in CR across the 18 countries in the sample.   
 
FIGURE 2: QOG AND INTRA-REGIONAL INEQUALITIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES WITHIN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
Table 3 reports the econometric results for H2. We find that across all model speci-
fications CPI exhibits a highly robust effect on the spatial spread of SMEs in countries under con-
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sideration. CPI’s effect remains significant at the 90% level of confidence or greater in all models. 
As hypothesized, more corrupt countries tend to have higher concentration of SMEs in the capital 
regions. The quantitative significance of the QoG factor is also substantial: in all multivariate mod-
els, a one-unit increase in the CPI score results in a decrease in capital ratio concentration by about 
one-fourth of a standard deviation of CR. We replicate the analysis using the World Bank Control of 
Corruption as a measure of the dependent variable and find the results to be substantially similar to 
those reported in Table 3.   
TABLE 3. QOG AND INTRA-REGIONAL INEQUALITIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES WITHIN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: OLS ESTIMATES 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Corruption -0.33*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21** -0.23* -0.26*** -0.24*** 
  (0.002) -0.008 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.001 -0.001 
Pop. Denisty 
 
0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003*** 
    -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.006 
EU15 (0/1)   -0.94** -0.93** -0.85 -0.88 -0.57 -0.61 
    -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 
Δglobalization     0.03         
      -0.43         
GDP p.c. (log)       -0.13       
        -0.84       
Income Inequality         0.01     
          -0.91     
Federalism (0/1)           -0.77**   
            -0.04   
Semi-federal (0/1)           -0.67**   
            -0.04   
Decentralization (RAI index)             -0.04* 
              -0.1 
Obs   18 18 18 18 18 18 
Rsq.    0.61 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.71 0.68 
 
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors and p-values in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the Capital Ratio in all 
models.  Omitted group in Federal model is unitary states in model 6. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
With respect to control variables, geographical factors, present in all multivariate 
models, demonstrate the hypothesized effect. Thus more populated countries have significantly 
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lower concentration of SMEs in their capitals compared to the less populated ones. The effect of 
the POPULATION DENSITY is robust across all model specifications. The older members of the 
European Union seem to have small business more evenly distributed on their territories than new 
member states. However in models 4-7 EU15 falls below the standard acceptable levels of statisti-
cal significance. Due to a relatively small sample in the national level analysis and thus low number 
of degrees of freedom, we test all control variables, but geographical factors, separately. For this 
reason the regression results for GDP, INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION and different types of 
power-sharing arrangements between the central and sub-national governments should be inter-
preted with caution.12  
 
 
TABLE 4. QOG AND INTRA-REGIONAL INEQUALITIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES WITHIN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
      Gini Index     Mod. Herfindahl       
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Corruption                         
  -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.33*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.48*** -0.48** -0.54*** -0.56*** 
Pop. Denisty -0.007 0 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.03 -0.001 0 
  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.003* 0.004** 0.005** 
EU15 (0/1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.003 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 
  -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.27 -0.04 -0.15 -0.57 -0.2 -0.22 -0.87 -0.23 -0.03 
Δglobalization -0.81 -0.76 -0.91 -0.63 -0.1 -0.74 -0.45 -0.85 -0.86 -0.53 -0.79 -0.97 
    -0.005           0.04         
GDP p.c. (log)   -0.89           -0.63         
      -0.04           -0.47       
Income Inequality     -0.94           -0.62       
        0.03           0.04     
Federalism (0/1)       -0.58           -0.71     
          -0.64           -1.03   
Semi-federal (0/1)         -0.22           -0.25   
          0.08           -0.53   
Decentralization (RAI index)         -0.71           -0.16   
                                                     
12
 The number of degrees of freedom in the regression results is admittedly rather small. The best solution would be to 
add observations: either years or countries.  However, these alternatives are not available due to a data limitation for 
the dependent variable.   
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            -0.03           -0.07* 
Obs           -0.33           -0.08 
Rsq.  18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
  0.58 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.67 0.63 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.64 
note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors and p-values in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the population weighted 
Gini index in models 1-6 and the modified Herfindahl index in 7-12.  Omitted group in Federal model is unitary states in 
models 5 and 11. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
We re-run all models using the Gini Index (Table 4, models 1-6) and the modified 
Herfindahl Index as the dependent variable (Table 4, models 7-12). The impact of CORRUPTION 
on intra-regional inequality of SMEs remains highly robust, as in each of the 12 robustness check 
regressions CORRUPTION is significant at the 95% level of confidence or greater, and its quantita-
tive significance is substantial. 
Overall, the proposition that QoG has an effect on the spatial distribution of enter-
prises within that polity finds its support in the data. Although wider implications from this analysis 
are somewhat limited due to a small number of observations, as far as the key independent variable 
is concerned there is evidence of a strong robust impact of corruption on the distribution of small 
business intra-regionally. Namely, more corrupt countries exhibit higher concentration of SMEs in 
their capital regions compared to less corrupt countries.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated both theoretically and empirically a novel factor that may be, albeit 
partially, responsible for the persistent differences in the socio-economic development of the Eu-
ropean regions and countries: the quality of their governments, understood as the extent to which 
government officials treat their citizens in an impartial way. As we have defined it, QoG refers not 
to the properties of formal rules but to the qualities of the day-to-day functioning of the govern-
ments. We have argued that the perceived quality of government is critically linked to the individu-
als’ calculus of the expected return on investment, and hence the comparative rates of entrepre-
neurship. This argument finds its support in the data: on average the EU regions with higher quality 
of government are associated with higher rates of entrepreneurship as compared to those regions in 
which government institutions are seen as less impartial.  
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A less intuitive and novel second finding of this study pertains to the spatial distri-
bution of entrepreneurship within countries. Driven by their dominant strategy to seek preferential 
treatment, entrepreneurs face incentives to create and maintain special relations with power holders 
and therefore to be closer to the source of privileges and locate their activities in the country’s cen-
ters of political power. As data has shown, the inequality of intra-regional (within countries) rates of 
entrepreneurship increases when governments are perceived as highly corrupt. More specifically, in 
countries with higher levels of perceived corruption, entrepreneurship tends to be overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the capital region.  
Currently, the ‘place’ effect, that is the impact of the economics of agglomeration, 
and the ‘people’ effect, that is the characteristics of individuals in ‘places’, are the two dominant 
ways of explaining why geographic inequalities emerge. This paper provides some evidence that the 
‘government quality’ may be an additional factor contributing to territorial inequalities. This paper’s 
tentative policy message would thus be that, in order to stimulate entrepreneurial activity (and, as a 
result, economic growth), current governmental policies, such as macroeconomic stabilization and 
cohesion, should be accompanied with concurrent measures to strengthen the impartiality of gov-
ernmental organizations. As there has long been concern about the ability of governments of all 
levels to reduce inequalities in European regions (Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper 2011), it may 
be particularly important to address the problem of the lack of government impartiality in addition 
to (or alternatively to) spend money on ‘people’ and ‘places’.  
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Appendix A. List of Regions with NUTS Codes
13
 and Values for 
Key Variables 
nuts name eqi smfirmspc Ent.Percp Index 
AT Austria 1.02981 20.8434 
 
AT11 Burgenland 1.31559 9.23771 2.44 
AT12 Niederöstrerreich 1.03166 11.4375 2.51 
AT13 Wien 1.05394 29.8235 2.47 
AT21 Kärnten 1.19978 14.4615 2.61 
AT22 Steiermark 0.886381 16.1667 2.53 
AT31 Oberösterreich 0.945855 26.1429 2.41 
AT32 Salzburg 0.917915 29.0008 2.73 
AT33 Tirol 1.17862 19.9769 2.56 
AT34 Voralberg 1.1091 20.2239 2.78 
BE Belgium 0.458369 71.8727 
 
BE1 Brussels -0.42523 114.818 2.27 
BE2 Vlaams Gewest 0.895579 82.9839 2.31 
BE3 Wallonie -0.06083 31.2083 2.16 
BG Bulgaria -1.71501 21.8947 
 
BG31 Severozapaden -2.55583 10.6467 1.96 
BG32 Severen Tsentralen -2.04673 12.4398 2.09 
BG33 Severoiztochen -0.89242 15.4177 1.98 
BG34 Yugoiztochen -2.12712 14.4545 2.07 
BG41 Yugozapaden -1.81411 42.7143 1.98 
BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen -1.06624 15.9333 2.08 
CZ Czech Rep. -0.47085 40.4 
 
CZ01 Praha -0.95185 103 2.42 
CZ02 Stredni Cechy -0.26818 33.5 2.43 
CZ03 Jihozapad -0.05153 30.75 2.26 
CZ04 Severozapad -0.95795 25.6364 2.31 
CZ05 Severovychod -0.15274 26.6667 2.28 
CZ06 Jihovychod -0.48636 36.9412 2.32 
CZ07 Stedni Morava -0.58057 31.5833 2.29 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko -0.4062 28.5833 2.23 
DK Denmark 1.50488 53.9636 
 
DK01 Hovedstaden 1.36661 82.3125 2.52 
                                                     
13
 NUTS stands for the ‘Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics’. Countries with data at the NUTS 1 level are 
Germany, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Belgium and Hungary.  Countries with data at the NUTS 2 level are Italy, 
France, Spain, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Denmark, Portugal and Austria.   
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DK02 Sjaelland 1.50988 26.2537 2.54 
DK03 Syddanmark 1.50124 48.6667 2.56 
DK04 Midtylland 1.74988 48.1667 2.56 
DK05 Nordjylland 1.3778 47.5141 2.56 
DE Germany 0.891681 19.3573 
 
DE1 Baden Wuttemberg 1.00631 17.9545 2.43 
DE2 Bavaria 0.735553 18.3615 2.26 
DE3 Berlin 1.00621 15.8529 2.16 
DE4 Brandenburg 1.00428 16.84 2.41 
DE5 Bremen 0.978363 27.452 2.13 
DE6 Hamburg 0.98653 36.1667 2.34 
DE7 Hessen 0.653386 23.3771 2.45 
DE8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 0.974513 17.4706 2.20 
DE9 Lower Saxony 0.962253 16.0875 2.34 
DEA North Rhine Westphalia 0.737961 21.1778 2.41 
DEB Rhineland-Palatinate 0.851008 13.7 2.38 
DEC Saarland 1.0776 18.4 2.33 
DED Saxony 1.1223 18.1429 2.24 
DEE Saxony-Anhalt 0.890451 18.4167 2.12 
DEF Schleswig-Holstein 1.3007 17.5714 2.43 
DEG Thuringia 1.3644 20.3913 1.96 
FR France 0.518532 30.6875 
 
FR10 Ile-de-France 0.523315 53.3583 2.41 
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 0.158887 32.3077 2.16 
FR22 Picardie 0.446533 23.7368 2.16 
FR23 Haute-Normandie 0.096569 23.8333 2.16 
FR24 Centre 0.590367 27.88 2.16 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 0.478219 25.2667 2.16 
FR26 Bourgogne 0.460739 27 2.16 
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.520476 24.5 2.18 
FR41 Lorraine 0.217802 22.0435 2.26 
FR42 Alsace 0.450548 27.0556 2.26 
FR43 Franche-Comte 0.470469 24.4167 2.26 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 0.331626 31.9143 2.31 
FR52 Bretagne 1.02329 26.2903 2.31 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 0.746213 25.0556 2.31 
FR61 Aquitaine 0.798136 26.75 2.37 
FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 0.369551 26.3571 2.37 
FR63 Limousin 0.704664 21.0715 2.37 
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FR71 Rhone-Alpes 0.777926 29.0656 2.36 
FR72 Auvergne 0.539434 22.3846 2.36 
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 0.512739 18.5 2.29 
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 0.189111 24.7755 2.29 
FR83 Corse 0.096337 22.4402 2.29 
FR91 Guadeloupe -0.62767 11.8507 
 
FR92 Martinique -0.47706 13.0636 
 
FR93 Guyane -0.58903 10.4856 
 
FR94 Reunion -0.19462 9.16021 
 
GR Greece -0.90298 17.0818 
 
GR1 Voreia Ellada -1.42846 10.3333 1.99 
GR2 Kentriki Ellada -1.1061 6.84 1.97 
GR3 Attica -0.29158 29.27 1.96 
GR4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti -0.94805 13.3636 2.06 
HU Hungary -0.58583 18.59 
 
HU1 Közép-Magyarország -1.0418 37.2069 2.28 
HU2 Dunántúl -0.3378 11.9355 2.27 
HU3 Észak és Alföld -0.45819 9.97561 2.17 
IT Italy -1.06412 43.6833 
 
ITC1 Piemonte -0.19134 43.3182 2.23 
ITC2 Valle d'Acosta 0.628704 43.6674 2.23 
ITC3 Ligura -0.58301 31 2.23 
ITC4 Lombardia -0.71493 85.0729 2.23 
ITD1 Bolzano 0.765892 72.9513 2.29 
ITD2 Trento 0.469774 53.7597 2.29 
ITD3 Veneto -0.53822 66.0833 2.29 
ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.12791 46.5833 2.29 
ITD5 Emilia-Romagna -0.41658 69.0233 2.29 
ITE1 Toscana -0.62714 44.8378 2.13 
ITE2 Umbria -0.26374 37.7879 2.13 
ITE3 Marche -0.53646 39.125 2.13 
ITE4 Lazio -1.34912 39.0357 2.13 
ITF1 Abruzzo -0.98791 27.6154 2.18 
ITF2 Molise -1.31774 18.4048 2.18 
ITF3 Campania -2.40817 20.431 2.18 
ITF4 Puglia -1.82057 14.9512 2.18 
ITF5 Basilicata -1.34076 13.3676 2.18 
ITF6 Calabria -2.27767 10.55 2.18 
ITG1 Sicilia -1.91426 13.52 2.12 
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ITG2 Sardegna -0.9662 16.5882 2.12 
NL Netherlands 1.25873 30.575 
 
NL1 Noord-Nederland 1.63937 9.17647 2.26 
NL2 Oost-Nederland 1.18969 18.4857 2.26 
NL3 West-Nederland 1.28504 43.1558 2.22 
NL4 Zuid-Nederland 1.08742 21.3056 2.26 
PL Poland -0.93941 19.4684 
 
PL11 Lodzkie -0.84682 16.0385 2.03 
PL12 Mazowieckie -0.99778 37.3269 2.03 
PL21 Malopolskie -0.87577 17.1515 2.09 
PL22 Slaskie -1.11766 17.5957 2.09 
PL31 Lubelskie -0.90548 9.81818 2.07 
PL32 Podkarpackie -0.85297 12.4762 2.07 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie -0.80495 13 2.07 
PL34 Podlaskie -0.96336 13.0833 2.07 
PL41 Wielkopolskie -1.00051 23.1471 2.12 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie -0.86786 16.5882 2.12 
PL43 Lubuskie -0.93084 16.1 2.12 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie -1.11875 17.5517 2.13 
PL52 Opolskie -0.60951 15.8 2.13 
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie -0.95097 16.6667 2.14 
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie -0.66755 12.2143 2.14 
PL63 Pomorskie -0.85844 19.3636 2.14 
PT Portugal -0.02713 37.1636 
 
PT11 Norte -0.34828 30.3243 2.22 
PT15 Algarve 0.185643 30.986 2.23 
PT16 Centro -0.05323 27.9583 2.26 
PT17 Lisboa 0.117834 61.5 2.26 
PT18 Alentejo 0.719336 24.1863 2.20 
PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores 0.491498 27.8763 2.28 
PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira 0.257568 76.6573 2.21 
RO Romania -1.7858 14.6273 
 
RO11 Nord-Vest -1.03706 11.8518 2.15 
RO12 Centru -1.48652 13.8 2.11 
RO21 Nord-Est -1.92242 6.86486 2.08 
RO22 Sud-Est -1.94356 12.4286 1.98 
RO31 Sud-Muntenia -1.6813 10.1515 2.11 
RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov -2.87937 53.5909 2.13 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia -1.38268 6.82609 2.02 
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RO42 Vest -2.16057 13.9474 2.22 
SK Slovakia -0.77012 16.9444 
 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj -0.56138 52.503 2.14 
SK02 Západné Slovensko -0.8555 14.0526 2.08 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko -0.75715 12.0714 1.98 
SK04 Východné Slovensko -0.76037 9.875 2.02 
ES Spain 0.004827 42.56 
 
ES11 Galicia 0.576937 35.8148 2.12 
ES12 Principado de Asturias 0.513811 29.8182 2.12 
ES13 Cantabria 0.142429 31.041 2.12 
ES21 Pais Vasco 0.66838 56.4286 2.18 
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 0.17228 58.7784 2.18 
ES23 La Rioja 0.2429 51.4059 2.18 
ES24 Aragón 0.320654 46.0769 2.18 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid -0.10041 72.6774 2.18 
ES41 Castilla y León -0.05675 27.52 2.21 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 0.207737 23.45 2.21 
ES43 Extremadura 0.417045 18.2727 2.21 
ES51 Cataluña -0.46911 60.0972 2.20 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 0.152923 38.2857 2.20 
ES53 Illes Balears 0.107674 32.1 2.20 
ES61 Andalucia -0.20166 21.9375 2.23 
ES62 Región de Murcia 0.284118 38 2.23 
ES63 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta (ES) 24.9872 
 
ES64 Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (ES) 11.5758 
 
ES70 Canarias (ES) 0.272443 33.95 2.09 
SE Sweden 1.39704 95.6413 
 
SE1 Östra Sverige 1.38552 108.229 2.43 
SE2 Södra Sverige 1.46352 99.075 2.45 
SE3 Norra Sverige 1.26877 61.6471 2.39 
UK United Kingdom 0.905569 38.3459 
 
UKC Northeast England 0.9076 21.9615 2.26 
UKD Northwest England 1.02969 32.2609 2.41 
UKE Yorkshire-Humber 0.638634 32.4808 2.27 
UKF East Midland England 1.23637 28.1136 2.29 
UKG West Midland England 0.787377 29.9259 2.29 
UKH East of England 0.750919 32.9649 2.39 
UKI London 0.469364 99.1053 2.37 
UKJ South East England 1.07228 35.253 2.30 
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UKK South West England 1.08075 25.4231 2.27 
UKL Wales 0.794087 19.1 2.27 
UKM Scotland 1.26864 26.1176 2.40 
UKN N. Ireland 0.922231 27.1111 2.18 
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Appendix B: Measuring the Quality of Government (EQI) 
The measure of regional quality of government – the European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI) – is based on a survey of about 34,000 EU citizens (approximately 200 respondents per re-
gion) which was funded by the European Commission.14 The respondents were asked to rate three 
core public services based on their own perceptions and experiences – education, health care and 
law enforcement – with respect to three related concepts of QoG – the quality, impartiality and the 
extent of corruption in their regions. The 16 QoG related questions – five pertaining to corruption 
perceptions and experiences, six to impartiality and five to the quality – were then aggregated into a 
single index for each region.  In addition to this, the sub-national survey assessment was combined 
with a national assessment from the World Bank’s ‘World Governance Indicators’ (WGI) (Kauf-
mann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009). This is done for two reasons. First, although the data capture 
regional differences with respect to the three public services mentioned above, there remains much 
unobserved ‘national context’ in the regional measure. It stands to reason that a region’s QoG may 
be affected by such nation-wide factors (e.g. legal system) that need to be accounted for when as-
sessing the overall QoG of any sub-national unit.  The second reason is more of a practical charac-
ter: 200 respondents per region is a relatively low number of observations.  Thus to ‘anchor’ each 
estimate, the national level data provided by the World Bank allows us to include outside assess-
ment of each country’s QoG, and add the necessary national context unobserved in the regional 
measure alone.  Essentially, the WGI data serve as each country’s mean score and the regional sur-
vey data provides information on the variation of a region’s QoG score relative to its country’s 
mean.  
Construction of the EQI: 
The index is built first by calculating a national average for each EU-27 country.  For this the coun-
try average from the WGI data for four indicators: ‘control of corruption’, ‘government effective-
ness’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘voice and accountability’ and combine the four into one composite index 
                                                     
14
 Research report prepared for the European Commission is available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/study_en.htm. The questionnaire can also be found in 
Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente (2012).   
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(equal weighting)15. Then, the combined WGI data is standardized for the EU sample. This figure is 
used as country’s mean score in the EQI for all 27 countries.  
The regional data itself combines 16 survey questions about the QoG in the region. 
Three public services in question are public education, public health care and law enforcement. The 
questions are centred on three QoG concepts: ‘quality’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘corruption’. In building 
the regional index, we aggregated these 16 indicators to three pillars based on factor analysis, la-
belled ‘quality’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘corruption’. Then these three pillars were averaged together to 
form the final index score for each region. After each stage of aggregation, the data are standard-
ized. For the nine countries outside of the regional survey, there is nothing to add to the WGI 
Country score, thus the WGI data is used as the QoG estimate alone, and regional variation is un-
observed. With respect to countries with the regional data, we set the national average using the 
WGI and explain the within country variance using the regional level data. Simply speaking, we 
aggregate the regional QoG score for each of the 18 countries in the survey, weighting each re-
gion’s score by their share of the national population. We then subtract this mean score from each 
region’s individual QoG score from the regional study, which shows if the region is above or below 
its national average and by how much. This figure is then added to the national level, WGI data, so 
each region has an adjusted score, centered on the WGI. The formula employed is the following:  
                                    (                                      ) 
where ‘EQI’ is the final score from each region or country in the EQI, ‘WGI’ is the World Bank’s 
national average for each country, ‘Rqog’ is each region’s score from the regional survey and 
‘CRqog’ is the country average (weighted by regional population) of all regions within the country 
from the regional survey. The EQI is standardized so that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation 
of ‘1’. Extensive sensitivity testing has been done for both the WGI national level data as well as 
the regional data within the index to show that the data is robust to several specification alterations 
in weighting scheme, aggregation and individual indicators among other changes (Charon 2010). A 
more detailed version of this description can be found in Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente (2012).  
 
 
                                                     
15
 In addition, we underwent extensive sensitivity testing of each of these 4 pillars of QoG from the World Bank and 
found the data to be highly robust (Charron 2010) 
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Appendix C: Constructing Entrepreneurial Index 
Question 7 of the Flush Eurobarometer survey’s  ‘Entrepreneurship in the EU and Beyond’ (EC 
2010) contains four statements:  
 “Entrepreneurs create new products and services and benefit us all” (entbenefits) 
 “Entrepreneurs think only about their own wallet” (entgreedy) 
 “Entrepreneurs are job creators” (entjobcreaters) 
 “Entrepreneurs exploit other people’s work” (entexploit) 
 
Each of the statements could be rated from ‘Strongly agree’ (1) to ‘Strongly disagree’ (4). ‘Don’t 
know’ was also an option, and during the aggregation this response was dropped.  
First, we created an index that captures perceptions of entrepreneurship in general. The individual 
responses were aggregated by NUTS region to correspond with the EQI and SMALL FIRMS vari-
ables and adjusted in such a way that higher values equate to more positive views of entrepreneur-
ship.  Then we performed a principle component factor analysis to assess internal validity of the 
index and to obtain relative weights when combining them into a single index. We found that the 
four variables loaded well together and according to the Keiser criterion, they load onto a single 
factor. The results showed that only one factor had an Eigenvalue above ‘1’ and that factor explains 
64% of the variation in the variables.  It should be noted that the Spearman Rank coefficient is 0.98 
when comparing the factor weighted index to an index of the four variables with equal weighting. 
The index can plausibly range from one to four, yet in the sample it ranges from 1.95 to 2.79 with a 
standard deviation of 0.15.   
obs: 168, retained factors: 2 
  
Factor Variance Difference proportion Cumlative 
Factor 1 1.6 0.83 0.79 0.79 
Factor 2 0.74 - 0.37 1.17 
     
     
 
Variable Factor 1 loadings Final index Weights 
 
 
entbenefits 0.204 0.090 
 
 
entgreedy 0.387 0.172 
 
 
entjobcreaters 0.839 0.372 
 
 
entexploit 0.826 0.366 
 
 
TOTAL 2.256 1.000 
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Appendix D. Summary Statistics of Variables and Data Sources 
  Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max Source 
I. Regional Level Data             
SME's (per 100K residents) 172 29.9 20.7 6.8 114.8 Author created,  raw data from Amadeus 
EQI (ST) 172 -0.0007 1 -2.88 1.75 Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente 2012 
EQI (corruption, ST) 172 -0.0009 1 -2.78 1.86 Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente 2012 
EQI (Impartiality, ST) 172 -0.0005 1.01 -2.65 1.87 Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente 2012 
Pop. Density (log) 
172 5.01 1.14 0.98 8.79 Eurostat 
Capital Region 172 0.103 0.31 0 1 Eurostat 
Pct. Non-EU born pop. (ST) 172 -0.0009 1 -1.02 4.31 Eurostat 
Pct. Tertiary Education (ST) 172 -0.001 1.001 -1.86 2.59 Eurostat 
Entreprenuerial Index (ST) 168 -0.00007 1 -1.87 3.62 Eurobarometer Flush 283 
GDP Growth (ave. 2000-07) 
168 2.89 1.54 0.5 8.7 Eurostat 
Tourism 168 32.05 21.53 3.3 91.1 Eurostat 
GDP (PPP p.c. log1995-97) 172 9.22 0.94 6.8 10.7 Eurostat 
              
II. National Level Data             
Capital Ratio (CR) 18 2.55 0.95 1.13 4.48 Author created, raw data from Amadeus 
Gini Index (x10) 18 2.37 0.78 0.82 3.46 Author created, raw data from Amadeus 
Mod. Herfindahl Index (MH x10) 
18 4.36 1.52 1.32 6.82 Author created, raw data from Amadeus 
Corruption (CPI) 18 6.24 1.93 3.8 9.3 Transparency International 
Corruption (World Bank) 
18 1.05 0.85 -1.7 2.32 Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009 
EU 15 
18 0.67 0.48 0 1 Author constructed  
Pop. Density (ave. 2007-09) 
18 155.9 113.4 22.5 487.4 Eurostat 
GDP (PPP p.c. log 1990-99) 18 9.81 0.55 8.7 10.3 Eurostat 
Gini Index household Inequality (ave. 1990-99) 18 29.8 3.7 23.3 36.2 UN Development Indicators 
Δglobalization 18 13.3 9.3 3.7 33.1 Dhreler 2006 
Federal 18 0.167 0.38 0 1 Author Created 
Semi-federal 18 0.11 0.32 0 1 Author Created 
Unitary 18 0.72 0.46 0 1 Author Created 
Decentralization (RAI) 18 13.1 8.1 1 29.3 Hooghe, Marks and Schakel  2010 
Note: ST indicates that the variable has been standardized.  
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Appendix E. Alternative Measures of the Spatial Inequalities of 
Entrepreneurship  
Using the formula from Shanker and Shah (2003) for the Gini index, we take the sum of 
the absolute difference of the population weighted SMALL FIRMS per capita for i
region
 
and j
region
, multiplied by the inverse of maximum value for a
country
 ( a
Y2
).   
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The Gini index ranges from ‘0’ (perfect equality, whereby each region has an equal amount 
of per capita SMEs) to )(1 ai Pp  for acountry .   
Building on the work of Ellison and Glaeser (1997) the modified Herfindahl Index (MH) is 
calculated using the following formula:  
                                                        
∑ |      |
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                                                 (2) 
Where MH in country ‘x’ equals the sum absolute difference of each region’s per capita 
small firms as a proportion of the total country’s small firms minus (  ) minus the propor-
tion of country ‘x’s population in that region (  ).  Similar to our first measure of inequali-
ty, this measure was found to be sensitive to the number of ‘n’ regions in each country, 
thus we adjust MH by one minus the inverse of the total number of regions.  Thus in a 
country where each region has the same proportion of SME’s as its population relative to 
the SME’s and population of the country on whole, MH would equal ‘0’, or zero inequality.  
Each measure of inequality is calculated at the NUTS 2 level except for Germany, UK and 
Belgium, which are NUTS 1.   
 
